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On the Possibility of Chinese Thought as Global Theory 
Leigh Jenco 
 
Globalization has expanded connections and narrowed distances between cultural, 
ethnic, and social groups.  These developments would suggest an ever-greater inclusion of 
global thought traditions to stand not only as the objects of academic inquiry, but also its 
generative structure and vocabulary.  However, despite sophisticated examinations by 
sociologists, literary theorists, historians, anthropologists and others about the nature of 
cultural exchange, the descriptions and theorizations of such trends remain firmly committed 
to a theoretical vocabulary that emerged from the languages and experiences of the Anglo-
European world.   Even those research paradigms most critical of Eurocentrism—including 
postcolonialism and comparative political theory—tend to frame their theoretical 
contributions as internal critiques of existing Europeanized discourses
1
 or as simple 
reminders of “both equivalences and differences” across cultures.2  This absence of non-
Western theoretical “voices” is particularly troubling, if, as Charles Taylor and others have 
argued, the human sciences differ from the natural sciences in that they seek not to discover 
natural causal laws, but to clarify the self-explanations of social actors and to articulate the 
norms which are essential to those explanations.
3
   In a deeply interconnected, multipolar 
world, the rigorous self-explanations of ethnic groups other than Anglo-Europeans should 
have their place in structuring legitimate social inquiry.   
This proposed volume attends to this more ambitious exploration of how, and under 
what conditions, so-called “non-Western” traditions of thought can serve to inspire and 
structure more generally applicable social and political theory, with a particular focus on 
Chinese thought.  Contributors inquire specifically about the conditions, both domestic and 
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international, under which scholars within and outside the Sinophone academic world can 
move Chinese theories and experiences from “local knowledge” to “universal knowledge”—
and in the process “rethink China,” (chong si Zhongguo) as scholars such as Zhao Tingyang 
have recently urged us.
4
  These essays therefore aim to do more than simply point out how 
“Western” universality can be self-reflexively interrogated, even as they reject the existence 
of some prefigured “core” of religious or social values readily transportable to the late-
modern West. Their task is thus an inherently theoretical one, in that they ask how the distinct 
experiences motivating the production of new knowledge for and within particular Chinese 
locales (such as Maoism or contemporary Chinese engagements with democracy) might be 
reinscribed with more general significance.   
This approach contrasts with dominant approaches to Asian thought since the 1990s, 
when the “Asian Values” debate piqued interest in the possibility of a distinctly Asian 
perspective on socio-political questions. Such scholarship often articulates some given set of 
values purportedly held by peoples of the Asian region,
5
 or attempts to discover “Chinese” 
analogues of particular Western concepts such as democracy or justice.
6
  In contrast, this 
volume does not focus directly on how the terms of Confucianism or Chinese thought can be 
“modernized.” Rather, contributors explore, through example, the possibility that scholars of 
any national background might work from or within particular non-Western intellectual 
discourses (of which Confucianism is only one among many others) to produce rigorous 
contributions to existing work in the humanities and the social sciences. Along the way, we 
interrogate rather than assume the conditions under which particular forms of Chinese 
knowledge, values or ideas come to be seen as useful or relevant.  Instead of constructing an 
equivalence between “local” Chinese findings and some more “universal” theory such as 
Marxism or democracy, these papers explore how the comparison might be reversed to 
accord Chinese experiences more authoritative generality.  Much as, for example, the French 
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Revolution is seen not as some local iteration of democratic practice or its “renewal from the 
margins,”7 but as itself a meaningful and constitutive embodiment of democratic principles 
offering lessons to anyone interested in “democracy,” so too should Chinese experience come 
to be seen as embodying more widely generalizable insight.    
This volume therefore seeks to explore the conditions under which knowledge might 
become applicable to other contexts beyond those that produced it. The implications of this 
shift is diverse, and extend into a wide variety of established disciplines. In this volume 
contributors examine some of the consequences for research in anthropology, philosophy, 
history, sociology, political theory and economics, but their analyses are careful to consider 
the ways in which Chinese thought may offer alternative, disciplinary homes to shelter new 
ways of thinking. Appropriately, despite the diversity of their approaches, each of the 
chapters speaks in some way to the problem of knowledge: where (and when) it might be 
found, who can (and should) produce it, and how we might make claims about its content or 
adequacy.   
The chapters also share a unique self-reflexivity, which is made possible by their 
willingness to produce theory in the act of exploring it.  That is, in performing political, 
social, and economic theory much as its subjects do—applying resources of diverse origins to 
discipline knowledge in the present—each chapter implicitly asks how we might learn from 
intellectual heritages that track local concerns even as they promise wider applicability.   In 
confronting the question of knowledge in a double way—that is, not simply from the 
perspective of the writer and reader, but also from the perspective of the subject of analysis—
these essays resist situating “the Chinese” as object and “we researchers” as subjects of 
knowledge. Instead, the process of moving between the contexts that inflect their knowledge 
and those that inflect ours is necessarily dialectical and mutually productive, blurring lines 
between self-other, internal-external, and researcher-researched.     
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To succeed in this task, we must confront the question of how, if social practices are 
constituted in part by what people think, say, and believe about them,
8
 these discourses of 
self-understanding can nevertheless move from one community to another—without claiming 
that such moves are underwritten by scientific neutrality, normative universality, or some 
historically essentialist core of meaning. How might we move through, rather than back from, 
the post-Wittgensteinian grounding of all philosophy and thought in specific communities of 
argument, practice, and belief (in short, the dependency of philosophy on “culture”)? 
Answering these questions requires a new way of looking both at “China” and at “theory,” 
and how those revised terms can support the ground-clearing efforts of this volume.   
 
On “Theory” 
As invoked in the social sciences and humanities, “theory” typically means a 
systematized body of thought, often identified with a particular lineage of thinkers or an 
ideological -ism, such as Marxism or poststructuralism.
9
  Here I would like to develop and 
defend a broader notion of theory, defining it simply as a generalization in which conditions 
in one place or at one time, or both, are articulated in such a way to apply to other places or 
times.  Put differently, theory is the de-territorialization of ideas to produce new and broader 
insight into social and political conditions elsewhere. To “theorize” thus means to reimagine 
diverse contexts, to visualize their similarities in ways that throw light on their differences, 
and vice-versa. Marx was theorizing when he posed the term “capital” to capture specific 
continuities in otherwise disparate historical contexts, enabling him to argue for their 
underlying (and perhaps otherwise overlooked) similarities in modes of production. But Mao 
Zedong and his colleagues were also theorizing when they applied Marx’s concept of 
feudalism to Chinese economic history using an indigenous term (fengjian), and realized that 
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the meaning of both “fengjian” and Marx’s “feudalism” required considerable revision before 
either could say something intelligible about the possibility for communism in China.
10
  
As has been frequently noted, in the modern era theory has travelled almost 
exclusively in one direction: from European and American intellectual discourse—often 
metonymically referred to as “the West,” despite its geographic diffusion across the world—
and toward the diverse experiences of Asians, Africans, Middle Easterners, and others, whose 
particularity at one point or another became subsumed within the hegemony of modern 
Western knowledge production. The influence of Eurocentric theory was enabled through 
European colonization and missionary work throughout the world, sustained by the economic, 
technological, and military power of the industrialized West. The challenge for contemporary 
scholarship, confronted directly by the contributors to this volume, is thus how to reverse the 
historical directional arrow.  How might we enable—or, more trenchantly, perform—the 
movement of theory from China toward other regions of thought, including the modern West?  
These possibilities, I submit, are contained within the idea of theory itself.   
 
The Pitfalls of Comparison 
In my definition here, theory is generated by the mobility of ideas across time and 
space, which draws attention to the ways in which contexts both transform and are 
transformed by its movement.  On this basis, Lydia Liu and others have emphasized the 
importance of “translingual practice,” in which meanings are not so much transferred as 
invented as they move from place to place.
11
  She is joined by others such as Naoki Sakai, 
who urge closer examination of the “excess” of translation and subsequent mutual 
transformation that accompany the use of theory, rather than of the substance of any given 
theory itself.
12
 This approach to the mobility of theory or meaning stems from a desire to 
rescue Chinese and other colonial or semicolonial societies from the imposition of 
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Eurocentric categories, which hinders the ability to gain clarity about the particularities of 
China’s struggle with modernity.  Resisting the assumption that there exists some given, 
“correct” meaning for any particular theory or idea—where “correct” is often identified with 
how it has been interpreted within its original European or American context—this approach 
focuses on how reciprocity between languages becomes “thinkable.”13  
As Wang Hui explains:  
 
From this perspective, words like “gong” [public], “geren” [individual], and “kexue” 
[science] and “shehuizhuyi”[socialism] are not transparent concepts. Moreover, they 
are not simple translations. There is a volatile relationship between these concepts and 
the life-worlds to which they refer: Firstly, by invoking a particular space, these 
concepts bestow meaning and order upon a previously unordered area of life. This 
also entails an evaluative tendency. Secondly, the relationship between concepts and 
the life-world involves more than naming. When “gong”, “geren”, “shehuizhuyi” and 
“kexue” and related concepts are constructed and enter into an historical context, these 
concepts themselves become part of the life world and a most vibrant factor in the 




In an article discussing these ideas, Viren Murthy makes the point that although “Wang 
objects to the use of Western categories because they have no relation to Chinese history,” 
Wang himself uses equally freighted, modern terms such as “social structure,” “discourse,” 
and “context” to describe Ming and Qing China—a move that Murthy insists, contra Wang, is 
unavoidable and sometimes useful.
15
   Roxanne Euben goes farther to show that such 
dissonance signals all theorizing as “an inherently comparative enterprise, an often (but not 
inevitably) transformative mediation between familiar and unfamiliar and, by extension, 
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between rootedness and critical distance.”16  For Euben, comparison is a necessary and 
omnipresent component of thinking about the world, and its worth lies not in how accurately 
it maps historical or material contexts but in how productively it enables reflection on and 
imagination of modes of life not one’s own.17  She argues that theory  
 
is inherently comparative because it is in comparison with other ways of living, being, 
and constructing political collectivities that “we” are led to question the coherence 
and naturalness of our own. Such questioning simultaneously presupposes and 
enables a critical distance toward our own cultural practices and commitments. This 
distance is crucial to see the larger patterns and connections that inform our lives and 





Her understanding of comparison suggests the productive rather than reductive character of 
Liu’s “translingual practices.”  To Euben, the disjunctures they mediate between what Liu 
calls host and target language are part of what makes theory possible. By showing that our 
knowledge is always comparative,  Euben powerfully refutes the possibility that political 
theory can or should continue to ignore the ideas and experiences “supposedly beyond its 
purview.”   Euben and other scholars in political theory and philosophy have pointed out that 
this move to include historically marginalized voices in ongoing disciplinary conversations 
does not contradict, but in fact fulfills, the mandate of theory (and its Greek predecessor, 
theoria) to explore the estranging and unfamiliar in search of new knowledge.
19
   
The approach of this volume intersects with this general trend to think critically and 
self-reflexively about how engagement with historically marginalized or “non-Western” 
others can transform our own inquiry, particularly the generalizations we recognize as 
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“theory.”  But there are two discomfiting implications with seeing comparison alone as the 
defining goal of our scholarly efforts.  The first is that, while comparison enhances our self-
reflexivity by providing alternatives to the intellectual positions we assume, this engagement 
with unfamiliar perspectives need not acknowledge the possible validity, for “us,” of their 
claims to knowledge.  In the passage cited above, Euben argues that the comparative mode of 
inquiry she describes avoids “making them speak to and for us.” On her view, we properly 
engage “culturally unfamiliar perspectives” when we question “the coherence and naturalness 
of our own” ways of doing things.  
The second implication follows from the first. Comparison often inscribes an us/them 
boundary by valuing those perspectives for their help in questioning “our own cultural 
practices and commitments,” and in seeing the “larger patterns and connections that inform 
our lives” (emphasis my own).  The others of which Euben speaks in the passage above are, 
that is, instruments to ends within what “we” take to be theory.  It is true that their 
perspectives provide windows into our understanding of them, and these engagements raise 
critical questions about “who may be recognized as theorizing, in what locales, and in which 
genres.”20 But to remain confined to comparison is to occupy a position distinct from that of 
the thinkers we research.
21
  Liu typifies such a distance when she does not explain why, if her 
own incorporation of theories from a wide range of languages and disciplines into the idiom 
of contemporary Anglophone academic historical writing is to be taken seriously as a 
contribution to knowledge, efforts by her Chinese subjects to do much the same thing are 
reduced to historicized processes of “translingual practice,” whose authenticity or viability is 
“beside the point.”22  Their self-knowledge and critical reflections remain the object of her 
study, rather than constitutive parts of the “theory” she produces.   
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As a result of moves such as these, the theoretical frameworks of most contemporary 
academic knowledge production are largely derived from Euro-American, and often 
Anglophone, scholarship.  As Margaret Hillenbrand notes,  
 
It is the ‘old masters’ of Western theory [such as Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, 
Frederic Jameson, and Benedict Anderson] who continue to describe the broad 
contours and grant features of the intellectual landscape, and whose influence is writ 
large all over the canvas. Indeed, many of the basic terms of reckoning and address 
which frame the study of contemporary East Asian culture—keywords like power, 
metropolis, postmodernism, nation—are routinely glossed via reference, and thus 
deference, to their Euro-American ‘originals.’23 
 
There are a few important exceptions to this characterization.
24
  But they remain at the 
contested fringes of disciplines whose terms they necessarily call into question, and often 
lack clear spaces of articulation.  
 
Theory and its Contexts 
These underwhelming outcomes are often said to reflect the difficulties of accessing 
worlds of knowledge situated differently from our own: the very embeddedness of humans in 
richly textured worlds of language and meaning implies that our grasp of the work of cultural 
others is always partial, inflected by our own existing worldviews. This is troublesome for the 
movement of theory because, as Charles Taylor has noted, social theories are “not about an 
independent object, but one that is partly constituted by self-understanding.”25  In order to 
grasp the social theories of others, we would have to understand the modes of life that in part 
constitute them by embodying the intentions and meanings of their practitioners.  Otherwise, 
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we would be explaining their ways of life in terms of what they mean to us, not to them.
26
  
Assuming that we cannot grasp these culturally-situated modes of life, Taylor and many 
others recommend a comparative perspective through which our own ways of life come to be 
perspicaciously resituated vis-à-vis those of others.
27
  In Fred Dallmayr’s words, this mode of 
“dialogic comparison” is uniquely suited to the task of cross-cultural understanding, as it 
“does not pretend to possess a fulcrum outside time and space and above any other 
philosophy, but rather involves continuous border crossing and negotiation of boundaries.”28  
Cross-cultural engagement is figured as a hermeneutic enterprise which enhances self-
reflexivity in the process of acknowledging difference, rather than an affirmation of 
differently-situated thought as a basis for generalizable knowledge production per se. 
I would like to suggest that such justifications tend to overstate the uniqueness of the 
challenge posed by cultural differences to our existing understanding, as well as of the degree 
to which knowledge is embedded in its local cultures of circulation. As a result, they tend to 
understate the degree to which our inquiry may be shaped by the terms that cultural others 
propose. This is because the intractability of the background conditions against which and in 
which theorization takes place is not a feature unique to cross-cultural inquiry (such as when 
“Western” thinkers try to understand “Chinese” thought).  If we accept that theories emerge 
in the process of applying local knowledge to conditions elsewhere, and vice-versa, then the 
tensions of difference are constituent, and not merely incidental, features of theory-making 
itself.   
It is certainly the case that theories emerge, as Taylor says, in and through practices 
specific to particular times and places. They articulate what it is we are doing, and make 
explicit the norms underlying given practices, in an attempt to clarify, criticize, and often 
transform local conditions.
29
  But despite their ambitions to reflect the environment that their 
claims address, theories necessarily respond to dilemmas over whose broader contexts the 
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theorist has little traction.  As Hannah Arendt explains it, it is not the actor’s original 
intention but the diverse responses by many interpreters that ultimately executes, and gives 
meaning to, any action.
30
  As a result, many scholars have criticized theory for imposing the 
order it claims to be discovering in the world.  Hanna Pitkin, in particular, argues that theory 
tyrannically re-draws the world in its own image, by refusing to negotiate the terms of its 
applicability to real people and their actions: “The theorist stands outside the political system 
about which he speculates and writes; of necessity he deploys and manipulates its citizens 
without considering their wishes or opinions.”31     
Pitkin urges theorists to politicize their claims, that is, enable ongoing, collective 
contestation of the terms they set out.
32
  But her complaint also reveals another aspect of 
theory-making: if theories make claims about dynamic social and political worlds comprised 
of many actors, this suggests that contexts are necessarily constructed, not assumed, as the 
theorist articulates the similarities and differences which ground the applicability of her 
theory.  This construction of context occurs in at least two different ways.  First, the point of 
any theory—say, about the definition of philosophy, the laws of economics, or the proper 
content of ritual—is to integrate the practices of otherwise disparate actors into some kind of 
coherent picture, so that some meaningful insight can be drawn about them as a category.  
Theories would not work unless they were posing some kind of similarity across difference, 
or some kind of difference across a perceived similarity.  And differences like these exist as 
much within a perceived society as without it—hence Pitkin’s complaint that theorists, in 
making theory, inadequately account for the particularities and responses of the people that a 
theory deliberately homogenizes.   
Second, theory-making always takes place in the present, even as it draws on 
historically and culturally situated resources that (again) are beyond the total control of the 
theorist herself. In the process of drawing on these resources, theories help to name the 
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contexts and conversations in which they can be said to intervene. Alisdaire MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor have read this process as one in which “traditions” of discourse are 
perpetuated.
33
  Yet it can equally be said that the process interrogates (rather than assumes) 
the extent to which local and global contexts inflect the meaning and applicability of any 
given idea, discourse, or insight.  Even if it is true that, as Taylor claims, “the explanatory 
sciences of society are logically and historically dependent on our self-definitions,”34 nothing 
about this dependency prevents those outside of “our” self-definitions from taking up the 
“explanatory sciences” they shape.  This possibility is amply demonstrated by the fact that 
the disciplinary standards of the modern social science and humanities have effectively 
displaced native categories of knowledge in most parts of the world.
35
   
Such open possibilities about the multivalent relationship of present knowledge to 
events in the past and future are a recurring theme in this volume.  Just as Chinese thinkers 
often contemplated the modes through which sagely knowledge of past dynasties might be 
assured in present contexts as well as secured for the future, many of the chapters here 
consider how “Chinese” presents and pasts may bode certain kinds of futures for other 
societies.  These possibilities turn on the realization that it is actually contradictory to confine 
the applicability of a theory to the specific social group in which it was originally formulated 
(even if, as is often the case, the theory played a role in constructing the social group it 
addresses, by naming its field of application).  In political science, for example, some theories 
identify “democracy” as a political system in which people lose elections. But as this 
definition is applied to new practices in new arenas, by new actors with new motivations and 
aspirations, its original claims are challenged and refigured in unceasing processes of 
“translingual practice.”  Democracy comes to be constantly renewed, but also critiqued—
might its parameters expand to include Confucian minben ideals, in which the state cares for 
the people (min) who are seen as the foundation (ben) of society, or do these ideals structure a 
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distinctly non-democratic vision of authoritarian order?  If the latter, might such an order still 
accord with democratic notions of legitimation?
36
  Does this matter? 
The differences that theories may capture as similarities (and vice-versa) may also 
serve as points of rupture or targets of interrogation.  The “legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” 
debate is one example of how a theory about what “philosophy” is and how it should be 
practiced can be both generalized to new contexts, as well as resisted on the basis of 
alternative views of knowledge.  The debate, which began in mainland China during the early 
2000s, turns on how well “philosophy,” understood as a contemporary academic discipline, 
functions to clarify what it is traditional and contemporary Chinese thinkers are doing when 
they produce “thought” (sixiang). Does the practice of academic philosophy simply need to 
be expanded to include Chinese thought, as Chen Lai has argued, or might the existence of 
alternative Chinese modes of knowing foundationally threaten its disciplinary integrity, as 
Wei Changbo has claimed?
37
 In this debate as elsewhere, the applicability of any given set of 
intellectual resources are underwritten not by the culture in which the theorist finds herself, 
but by comparative judgments that construct equivalences and differences between contexts 
that may span space and time. The question of whether Chinese thought is “philosophy” turns 
not on the ethnic identity of its producers, or on which cultural milieu they claim as their own, 
but rather on a disagreement about the extent to which such thought bears similarity to what 
is recognized as philosophy.   
Often comparative judgments like these do work to shore up perceived cultural 
boundaries, by posing connections between otherwise historically and socially disparate 
groups.  Ancient Athenian political philosophy is assumed to have immediate and transparent 
relevance to all contemporary “Westerners,” regardless of their own diverse cultures and 
experiences; and in much the same way, ancient texts written in diverse scripts and excavated 
in diverse locales throughout what is now China are often presumed to have immediate 
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relevance to contemporary Asians, who inhabit a vast region of enormous cultural, religious, 
and historical complexity.  These continuities are often presented as self-evident and 
historically continuous, part of the “tradition” in which some we-group is rooted, and through 
which that group articulates its most serious questions.
38
  As Chris Goto-Jones has noted, 
however, such traditions are never self-evident givens. They rely on ceaseless work by self-
identified participants to continually exclude or include particular areas of thought along what 
Goto-Jones calls their “central disciplinary highway.” These exclusions are often political 
rather than intellectual; in the case of Western political thought, for example, Goto-Jones 
identifies an ongoing resistance by participants to include non-Western thought, contradicting 
the “aspirant universalism” behind their claims to provide generally applicable scholarship 
which confronts the present’s most pressing questions.39   
 “Theory” thus refers not to some specific body of texts or ideologies, but to de-
territorialized claims sustained by comparative judgments, which pose equivalences and 
differences between temporal, cultural, spatial, or other perceived contexts.  Theory is not 
reducible to comparative judgments, however, because even these must be grounded in 
particular communities of argument, whose discursive standards generate particular claims, 
and render them valid and intelligible.  This definition does not mean to impose a unity on 
each chapter’s invocation of “theory,” so much as it draws attention to theory’s contexts and 
consequences. The most important of these contexts are the Chinese (or Sinophone) 
communities of argument, whose discourses generate insights and support modes of 
reflection in each of the chapters to follow, but which historically have been overlooked in 
social and political theory.  But first, we must first respond to concerns that, in posing 
“Chinese” theory, we are both shoring up a problematic ethnic category and mimicking the 




On “China” and “Chinese” 
Recent scholarship has persuasively deconstructed prefigured and monolithic notions 
of Chinese-ness, urging greater attention both to the internal complexities of Chinese thought 
and practice, as well as to the ethnic heterogeneity that claims to a unified Chinese 
civilization often obscure.
40
  These considerations can also be extended to the larger signifier 
of “Asia,” into which China is often drawn. In a recent article, Shu-mei Shih reminds scholars 
to work against the Asia versus Western binary, and not only for the well-known 
consequence that the binary marks the “West” as a category of undifferentiated yet 
authoritative general knowledge and “Asia” as a category of particular knowledge. Shih 
argues that the binary further distances Asia from “the domain of theory,” by willfully 
forgetting the “historical crossings that necessarily constituted the formation of what we call 
theory today.”41 In China, in particular, it reproduces an “imperial subconscious” which 
effaces its own suppression of difference, obscuring in particular the diverse (non-Han) 
multi-ethnicism that historically characterized the Qing empire.
42
   
A typical response to these dilemmas has been to interrogate the conditions under 
which claims to identity, whether presenting themselves as “Western,” “Asian,” “Chinese,” 
or anything else, come to circulate and have meaning for particular people at particular times. 
Emphasizing the hybrid character of all thought does important work in pointing out the 
process-based character of all identity: identities (or cultures or civilizations) are never 
unified, but constantly in the process of fracturing, blending, and (re-)becoming as they 
respond to ongoing contact with different modes of living and thinking. As Homi Bhabha 
argues, identities are simply not there in any primordial sense, nor do they reflect a unitary or 
homogenous political object.  Rather, “the transformational value of change lies in the 
rearticulation, or translation, of elements that are neither the One…nor the Other… but 
something else besides, which contests the terms and categories of both.”43  Hybridity 
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theories help to show, for example, that claims to universal reason which justified European 
imperial projects are not self-evident and self-sufficient truths, but historically situated claims 
which gain diverse meanings from oppositional contrasts to the practices of non-European 
peoples.
44
   
In contesting Enlightenment claims to a unified reason and identity, hybridity 
valorizes particular local experience as a site of theory-making.  It thereby offers an 
important tool for those scholars, including ourselves, who hope to draw attention to the ways 
in which Europeanized knowledge continues to occlude the theoretical autonomy of non-
Westerners.  Some of this work has been marshaled in the service of what Dipesh 
Chakrabarty has called “provincializing Europe,” which seeks to reveal how Western claims 
to knowledge efface the particularity of certain subordinate social groups.  But rather than 
discard Western thought, Chakrabarty urges scholars to see it now as “everybody’s heritage,” 
and to find ways it can be “renewed from and for the margins.”  As Chakrabarty explains, 
“The point is not to reject social science categories but to release into the space occupied by 
particular Euro histories sedimented in them other normative and theoretical thought 
enshrined in other existing life practices and their archives.”45   
In work that predated Chakrabarty’s by fifty years, Takeuchi Yoshimi similarly called 
for “the Orient…to change the West in order to further elevate those universal values that the 
West itself has produced,” such that these values become “possible as method, that is to say, 
as the process of the subject’s self-formation.”46 Takeuchi joined other critics of modernity, 
slowly emerging in East Asia at least since the beginning of the twentieth century, who 
thought creatively about how an idea of “Asia” could offer a novel counterpoint to Western 
notions of progress and enlightenment.  Like Chakrabarty and Takeuchi, however, these 
critical voices often saw in Asia not a repository of unique alternatives but a position from 
which to re-think the “West,” whose terms continued to form the core of meaningful thought.   
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Du Yaquan, editor of the Eastern Miscellany, one of the most influential Chinese 
publications in the first half of the twentieth century, is a case in point.  In a 1916 essay, he 
powerfully refutes claims that Asia lags behind the West, arguing instead that the two 
civilizations were different in kind rather than in level of development.  As such, the “passive” 
(jing) East had much to offer the “active” (dong) West, whose weaknesses as an aggressive, 
individualistic and competitive civilization became increasingly apparent during the first 
world war.
47
   
These approaches are important steps toward recognizing Asia as a site of 
generalizable knowledge—of knowledge potentially applicable not only to people identified 
(or identifying) as Asians but to anyone else as well.  But using Asian thought and experience 
to mark fissures or failures of Western knowledge carries a dual, and mutually paradoxical, 
threat, which may hinder the validation of Asian theory:  either it poses a false and possibly 
essentialist homogeneity for “Asian” (and, by extension, “Chinese” thought); or it fragments 
the coherence that sustains meaningful intellectual development.  Du and his contemporaries 
across East and South Asia often edged close to the first kind of threat, in their search for a 
set of values to counteract what they saw as the excesses of Western materialism.  Laying 
claim, as they did, to unique “Asian” values or civilization does clear space for the assertion 
of global difference. But in posing alternatives to hegemonic categories, it ends up enforcing 
some of its own. “Asian Values” discourse of the 1990s offers a well-known example of how 
a term originally posed as a source of critique can become a badge of orthodoxy and 
intolerance. Lee Kwan Yew and Mahathir Mohamed are only the most well-known to claim 
that “Asian societies are unlike Western ones,” in that they value family relationships and 
economic development over democracy and human rights.
48
   
The stark binaries invoked in these statements led scholars such as Amartya Sen to 
issue reminders of the enormous intellectual, cultural and political diversity encompassed by 
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the term “Asia.”49  Sen joins Bhabha and others in pointing out how the hybrid character of 
thought and experience counteracts hegemonic discourses of identity. At the same time, 
however, this hybridity discourse broaches the second kind of threat, in that it hinders 
recognition of the internally self-referential and often long-standing discourses of reflection 
produced by these very non-Europeans.  This is not only for the obvious consequence that 
claims to valorize “Chinese” thought risk accusations of being essentialist, hyper-nationalist, 
or otherwise untenable given the historical and cultural diversity of thought in the region.  
Hybridity also justifies a paradoxically insular perspective in which European thought, now 
seen as at least partially constituted by engagements with its cultural others, can be construed 
as sufficiently “globalized,” so as to warrant little or no investigation of the actual thought of 
those others.  The contributions of non-Europeans to global thought and history can be 
affirmed, even as the theoretical richness of intellectual life outside of Europe or the United 
States is ignored as a subject of scholarship.  Scholars influenced by hybridity and related 
ideas typically undertake something like what Talal Asad calls a “historical anthropology that 
takes the cultural hegemony of the West as its object of inquiry,”50 or an exploration of how a 
term like “Chinese” becomes re-evaluated in “the catachrestic modes of its signification.”51  
They attend to the processes by which such identities come to be articulated and supported, 
rather than to the potential theoretical substance of the claims themselves.   
Is it possible to recognize Chinese thought as a coherent site of theory-production, 
without at the same time assuming some essentialist core that verifies its Chineseness? One 
possibility may be to consider what Yu Ying-shih, referring to Chinese intellectual history, 
called its “inner logic” (nei zai li lu).52 Citing the inadequacy of typical theories used to 
explain the transition from neo-Confucian lixue (“study of principle”) in the Ming dynasty to 
the text-critical methods of the kaozheng (“empirical research”) school, Yu suggests that we 
look to the intellectual self-understandings of the participants themselves. Participants did not 
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see the two intellectual approaches which respectively characterized each dynasty and were 
mutually opposed, but rather saw two different means to the same end. Qing dynasty scholars 
themselves often viewed their dynastic intellectual heritage as continuous with, and in some 
ways more efficaciously serving, the basic aims of Ming dynasty neo-Confucianism.
53
  This 
self-understanding explains the turn to kaozheng in more illuminating ways than do post-
facto (or what Yu calls “external”) explanations which ascribe the shift to a fear of censorship 
by Manchu rulers, or the growth of an emergent bourgeois sensibility. 
Yu’s point, I think, is not that a discourse like that which spanned the Ming-Qing 
transition is impermeable, or even that its terms of art are self-sufficient. He takes particular 
pains to emphasize that his internal explanation is only one among many that can and should 
be used to explain why Qing intellectual history eventually developed the way that it did.
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But Yu does draw attention to how discourses are shaped and constituted by historical, social, 
institutional, discursive and other linkages, which bind together a community of knowledge 
in such a way as to sustain, over time, particular modes of systematic reflection over others. 
These linkages transmit and refigure the logic by which particular communities see certain 
ideas as intelligible and relevant, and others as inconsequential. They also regulate, through 
historically specific modes of power and influence, the degree to which individuals can be 
said to contribute to the discussions of that community, and how their contributions will 
resonate within its existing practices.  In this volume, Wu Guanjun’s chapter suggests ways in 
which, in the mainland Chinese case at least, understanding of the Chinese community is 
often manifest in the sign of the nation-state.  This “locality” is thus not only cultural, but 
also political and temporal: it extends across time and cuts through generations in the form of 
what Tim Cheek in his chapter calls “burning questions that confront different generations” 
in different ways.
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Given these considerations, the idea of “Chinese theory” at work here should be 
understood not as a hermetically sealed, internally homogenous entity. Rather, it marks a set 
of historically variegated, deeply hybridized yet often internally self-referential discourses 
and experiences, which can produce and discipline generalizations that apply across time and 
space.  It is important to emphasize here that “Chinese theory” in its broadest sense is not 
sited only in Sinophone discourses. It may also include examination of experiences and 
historical events to formulate new explanations for conditions in Chinese economic, political, 
and social worlds, particularly those that lie outside the predictions of mainstream social 
science. In a seminal article, Philip Huang saw here the opportunity of asserting the 
“theoretical autonomy” of Chinese studies, in which we “break free of the conceptual 
constraints of the past and…join in the common search for new theoretical concepts” based 
on micro-social analyses of Chinese experience.
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 These new concepts can, in turn, be 
felicitously applied to other contexts, including late modern Euro-America.  Generating 
“Chinese theory” therefore means to enlarge and apply Chinese thought and experience in 
ways that are both unprecedented for, yet meaningfully continuous with, the specific contexts 
of their emergence.  However, consonant with the discussion of “theory” above, the wider 
purchase of these theories cannot be assumed a priori; they are always sustained by 
comparative judgments, which themselves help to frame the contexts in which those claims 
apply.   
Contributors to this volume offer examples of all these modes of producing Chinese 
theory. Some chapters (particularly those of Nakajima, Villagran and Brown, Jenco, and 
Cheek) examine historically-situated Sinophone discourses in depth, to articulate ideas which 
can offer, and sometimes have already offered, more general insight into social and political 
life.  Other chapters, such as that of Dowdle, use emerging Chinese economic and political 
realities to map a new global future on the basis of Chinese models. Still others (including 
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Davies, Li, and Wu) tack between the discourses that mediate Chinese intellectual experience, 
on the one hand, and the events or conditions that make such knowledge production possible, 
on the other.  Despite this diversity, all of these chapters share a commitment to showcase the 
possibility of Chinese thought and experience as more than a mere case study.  They also 
encourage reflection on the ways in which academic knowledge-production itself—not only 
in terms of our subjects and terms of study, but also the attitudes we bring to that study—may 
itself be enriched and transformed by the Chinese theories explored in this volume.  This 
includes bringing into focus both the difficulty and irony of experimenting with ways of 
thinking in Chinese while doing so in English (a point nicely thematized by Davies’ chapter).  
We intervene in Eurocentric Anglophone discourse even as we explore alternatives to it; we 
highlight the marginalized features of Sinophone discourse which have been systematically 
excluded from contemporary academic knowledge production, even as our very use of those 
discourses undoes clear binaries between “Chinese” and “Western” ideas.  Each chapter 
works from Chinese perspectives—taking into account a wide range of primary and 
secondary material in Chinese, produced for both academic and popular audiences—to reflect 
on these adventurous possibilities for the location of knowledge, its conditions of production, 
and the modes through which its content or adequacy is legitimated, challenged, and 
sustained.   
The volume is divided into two parts. The chapters in Part I, “Chinese Theory and the 
Conditions of Knowledge,” explore Chinese ideas about knowledge to reflect on the 
conditions under which it may enjoy more general applicability, including how and where 
such knowledge may meaningfully circulate.  These insights are extended in Part II, “Moving 
Chinese Thought Across Time and Space,” which demonstrates the ways in which Chinese 
thought and experience offer the same kind of predictive and culturally autonomous insight 





In Chapter 1, “Knowing How to Be: The Dangers of Putting (Chinese) Thought into 
Action,” Gloria Davies self-reflexively considers the task of theory-making from a Chinese 
perspective. In doing so, she helps to frame subsequent chapters’ explorations of the 
emotional regimes and substantive relationships that mark Chinese theories of knowing.  
Davies asks how Chinese thought (sixiang) might be generalized as theory, while retaining its 
identity as a form of inquiry characteristically harnessed to a moral and pedagogical resolve. 
According to Davies, academics in the Euro-American world generally tend to advance 
intellectual inquiry which, in a post-Enlightenment spirit, “relies on tools for reasoning that 
are designed to make conceptual analysis ever more precise.”57  In contrast, sixiang 
constitutes not so much a technique of knowledge as a “redemptive disposition” that “expects 
knowledge to deliver a good.”58 This long-standing disposition in Chinese critical inquiry 
constructs particular relationships to the past in the form of what Davies calls a “poetics of 
history,” which accords special importance to the concrete achievements of historical 
exemplars so as to provide redemptive moral instruction to thinkers in the present.
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  The 
chapter argues that if we wish to affirm Chinese thought as “global theory,” we would need 
to broaden the very idea of theory to include the moral insights to which Chinese thought 
aspires—which frequently take it toward questions of how to be as opposed to the Western 
philosophical preoccupation with what is. Davies warns us that our very attitudes toward 
knowledge, and “our” past, must change as we come to “think of our acts of intellectual 
discrimination as reflective of our personal conduct.”60   
What, then, are the implications for using Chinese thought as theory, given that it 
often endows knowing with a moral purpose? The next two chapters consider ways in which 
the emotive commitments of Chinese knowledge may actually resolve tensions within 
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contemporary philosophy. Paralleling the connection between emotion and morality limned 
by Davies, in Chapter 2, “Grounding Normativity in Ritual: A Re-reading of Confucian 
Texts,” Takahiro Nakajima examines theories of ritual in classical and medieval Chinese 
discussions to show how their emotionally regulatory capacities offer alternative groundings 
for normativity.  Analytic philosophy has long struggled to locate the foundations of 
normativity in the structure of human consciousness, but has so far failed to do so without 
appealing to transcendence.  Nakajima argues, however, that Confucian philosophers, 
particularly Xunzi, articulate an alternative, and potentially successful, form of normativity 
through the performance of rituals, which they understand as grounded in the natural 
affections of human beings. Ritual, which Nakajima argues can be understood as socially-
emergent customs rather than sage-derived rules, transforms natural affections by extending 
them outward to other beings, including animals; as such, it avoids reference to a universal 
principle of the good in favor of other-oriented emotional practice.  
Timothy Cheek shows how these creative preoccupations with emotion as a basis for 
normative and political knowledge recur in twentieth-century Chinese political theory. In 
Chapter 3, “Attitudes in Action: Maoism as Emotional Political Theory,” Cheek draws from 
Mao Zedong’s re-reading of Leninist Marxism to show that emotion has long been theorized 
as integral to proper modes of knowing and being in Chinese contexts.  In Maoism, thought is 
conceived not only as information, but as a form of proper practice, brought into being 
through correct “cognio-affective dispositions” (taidu) which are conceived as both the 
mechanism and embodiment of human agency. Taidu theory, Cheek argues, provides a 
vocabulary for deconstructing habitual, reactive, or unreflective action, but more importantly 
posits an explanatory mechanism for change in cognitive activities. It therefore usefully 
addresses the question of normative and motivational forces in political life. Where much 
political theory of emotions has focused on how feelings may influence cognitive judgment 
32 
 
and deliberation, taidu also prescribes a method for political action in the form of a pedagogy 
of self-transformation.   
As these chapters suggest, the tight relationship between cultivated emotion and 
correct action in both historical and contemporary Chinese thought offers important insights, 
but nevertheless is not without its tensions.  Chapter 4, the final chapter in this section, “A 
(Psycho)Analysis of China’s New Nationalism,” examines the consequences of those 
emotional configurations in the production of contemporary Chinese nationalist sentiment. 
Drawing on both internal self-analyses and external evaluations of popular and intellectual 
nationalism in the PRC, Wu Guanjun shows how these discourses embody fears of both 
cultural others, such as the “West,” and historical and future uncertainty about the place of 
China in a larger world.  This chapter offers a useful close analysis of the ways in which 
mainland Chinese intellectuals in particular debate both the boundaries of space (national 
territory) and time (the global future), on the one hand, as well as China’s role in constructing 
and inhabiting those spheres, on the other. In doing so, it illuminates the internal debates 
which contest the boundaries of Chinese identity (prominently though not exclusively 
associated with nationalism) and which regulate the promotion of “Chinese” models and 
ideas elsewhere. 
Building from the theoretical possibilities articulated in Part I, the chapters in Part II, 
“Chinese Thought Across Time and Space,” show that not only do Chinese pasts offer insight 
into the Chinese present, but contemporary trends in mainland China may herald the 
economic and legal future in other parts of the globalizing world, including Europe and the 
Americas.  These possibilities are anchored in Chinese theories of knowledge mobility 
examined in Chapter 5, “New Communities for New Knowledge: Theorizing the Movement 
of Ideas Across Space.”  Leigh Jenco draws on the work of two seminal thinkers of modern 
China, Liang Qichao and Yan Fu, to theorize the transportability of new ideas into 
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geographically and culturally distant communities (what Liang and Yan call qun).  Their 
approach contrasts with many recent critiques of ethnocentric knowledge production, such as 
those of Charles Taylor, where communities mark the contextual limitations to the 
application of knowledge generated elsewhere.  Yan and Liang rather ask a more political 
question: how might communities be created or transformed to broaden the circulation and 
application of knowledge?  Practically, the two thinkers built study societies and local 
parliaments to enact the communities demanded by Western forms of governance; 
theoretically, they advanced a specialized “study of communities” (qunxue), which offers 
both example and theory of how the community-based character of knowledge can expand 
rather than limit the contexts in which knowledge is meaningful.   
In suggesting qunxue as an explanation of how knowledge moves across communities, 
Liang and Yan indicate the metatheoretical capacity of Chinese thought—that is, its capacity 
to think creatively about how theories themselves may interact, evolve, and have an effect on 
the world. Chapter 6 continues this exploration from a Confucian perspective, while offering 
further reflection on the connection between knowledge and emotive commitment raised in 
Section I.  In “The Evolution and Identity of Confucianism:  
The Precedence Principle in Reforming Tradition,” Chenyang Li explores a Confucian 
approach to understanding the underlying historical identity of a shared set of practices and 
thought. In a demonstration of simultaneously thinking both about and within what he calls 
the “Confucian cultural community,” Li argues that the idea of precedence (xu) as theorized 
by a wide range of Confucian thinkers, such as Han Yu and Zhu Xi, can help to validate 
future evolutions of the tradition, without at the same time ascribing to it a core set of 
essentialist features.  He draws on a broad range of comparisons, including Chan (Zen) 
Buddhism and contemporary Western hermeneutic philosophy, to show that the means to 
preserve the dao (or “way”) of any given cultural tradition may be to allow that dao to 
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change in response to future challenges, but only in ways which can be justified to a 
community of believers as having precedent.  
In Chapter 7, “Being in Time: What Medieval Chinese Theorists can Teach Us about 
Causation,” Ignacio Villagran and Miranda Brown join Li in considering how Chinese 
theorizations of temporality and historicity may resolve problematic impasses within 
contemporary social science and the humanities, by examining a series of thinkers from the 
Tang dynasty. Whereas many current critics of positivist methods in sociology and history 
have pointed out the problems with assuming the causal uniformity of human events, they 
have failed to provide a clear alternative which can both remain true to human particularity 
and yet recognize trans-historical patterns.  Brown and Villagran show, however, that Tang 
dynasty debates over state centralization theorized a range of methods for understanding the 
past in the present, which neither turned on assumptions of uniform causality nor collapsed 
into fragmentary specificity.   Rather, these thinkers—including the well-known poet Liu 
Zongyuan—“understood time as an uneven patchwork of temporal registers” which 
nevertheless could evince meaningful patterns across human contingency.
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These chapters explore Chinese textual resources and lived experience to consider 
how the past of some communities may offer keys to the situation of those of us in the 
present.  In the last chapter, “China’s Present as the World’s Future: China and ‘Rule of Law’ 
in a Post-Fordist World,” Michael Dowdle also considers how contemporary trends in China 
may herald the future for other societies around the globe.  Many legal and economic 
commentators have denigrated China as a “developmental laggard” for its inability to develop 
rule of law, constitutional strength, and economic regulatory capacity.  Dowdle, however, 
argues that the very terms of these criticisms turn on what may now be an outdated view of 
legal, institutional and economic development. This view incorrectly characterizes China as 
behind the rest of the world, when in reality it may be ahead of it.  Using emerging insights 
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from Chinese “New Left” discourse, Dowdle suggests how global economic development can 
be theorized in new ways, taking China’s “post-Fordist” economic model as the central 
example of where the rest of the world may be heading.   
Taken collectively, the chapters in this volume encourage us as researchers to think 
about what we can do, and what  we are already doing, to activate Chinese thinkers as 
“precedents” (xu) for our own actions, and form what Margaret Hillenbrand calls “the skein 
of discourse” created around “rare and resonant ideas” that make theory of diverse kinds 
possible.
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  As we form these connections, which are necessarily social, emotive, and 
institutional as well as intellectual, the potential applicability of Chinese thought beyond its 
sites of origin gives the lie to simple binaries of “inside” or “outside,” because those 
boundaries are by definition transgressed as ideas circulate out of their sites of origin. In 
much the same way, contributors’ varied attempts to mobilize Chinese thought as an 
internally diverse and more generally applicable body of theory affirms the importance of 
attending to the local circumstances of its production, even as the move to apply it elsewhere 
breaks down clear boundaries between “Chinese” and “non-Chinese” thought.   Accordingly, 
this volume assumes no given core to “Chinese thought,” nor does it point toward any 
singular mode of performing “Chinese thought as global theory.”  Rather, we accept that the 
richness of Chinese thought comes into view precisely through its application to diverse new 
arenas of inquiry, such as those on offer here.   
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